Relevence of Saul Kripke's 'Naming and Necessity' of Multiverse Theory Constructions?

Reading through Saul Kripke’s 1973 ‘Naming and Necessity’ in my frosty ( 0 degrees F) tent, it occured to me that the philosophical investigations of the logic of necessity and for modal logic and of naming have relevance to physical cosmology and multiverse theory.

Kripke wrote that ‘no one formal system decides all mathematical questions, as we know from Gödel.” He wrote that after using the Goldbach conjecture as an example (pages 72 and 73)

in the effort to investigate a theory of descriptions of names and ambiguity in objects of reference. Gödel’s incompleteness theorem finds a parallel in language.

For that we can thank Quine and his ‘Ontological relativity’ for exposition. Names are tools for description and for making objective references rather than things-in-themselves. Names and descriptions find their meaning within a relative context of us with some applications being valid and others relatively invalid-we find weather reports and predictions the same way.

The problems of incompleteness theorems and of relative validity of names as well as the difficulties in eliminating uncertainty from mathematical values believed to have the qualities of a prioricity or necessity of validity implies that conjectures of cosmology abut all possible worlds and representational infinite universes theories would find incompleteness within the mathematical representations such that it would disconnect from valid predictive description of what objectify exists beyond possible observation.