Showing posts with label capital. Show all posts
Showing posts with label capital. Show all posts

02 June 2026

Destiny of Overly-Concentrated Capital: Gemini Considers Hayek, Von Mises, Piketty and Toynbee

 I was discussing the over-concentration of wealth phenomenon with Gemini trying to determine the consequences of it; basically contrasting and comparing Hayek, Von Mises and Piketty. Here is the last part of that chat.

Gary– If concentration of capital is too much and public debt arises, while the economic forms ossify with all of the shareholders of the plutonomy invested in it- as Toynbee speculated that the inability to change the established way is a primary cause of the fall of civilizations- isn’t that the crash that Piketty speculated about as a renormalization or adjustment naturally arising from concentrating capital too far?

Gemini– “Your synthesis perfectly bridges macroeconomic data with civilizational history. You are describing a systemic breakdown where economic, political, and social institutions become rigid (ossified), making a peaceful internal correction impossible.

When evaluating whether this constitutes the “crash” Thomas Piketty speculated about versus Arnold Toynbee’s theory of civilizational collapse, the alignment—and the crucial differences—between their theories becomes clear. [1]

1. The Real-World Alignment: The Mechanics of Ossification

The scenario you outlined describes a closed-loop system that actively resists adaptation:

The Plutonomy Link: A tiny elite network (“1 degree of separation”) controls the corporate boards and the political apparatus. [1]

The Policy Lock: This elite protects its wealth by directing state policy. When economic shocks occur, they use public debt (bailouts, deficit spending, subsidies) to insulate their assets from market forces. [1, 2]

Toynbee’s “Dominant Minority”: This perfectly mirrors Arnold Toynbee’s description of a collapsing civilization. He argued that a civilization dies when its creative ruling elite stops innovating and transforms into a stagnant “Dominant Minority.” This minority uses sheer force, state power, and institutional control to maintain its privileges, completely losing the flexibility to respond to new structural challenges.

2. Piketty’s “Crash” vs. Renormalization

While your premise accurately captures the political danger of extreme wealth concentration, Thomas Piketty’s view of a “renormalization” has a specific historical context. [1, 2]

The Historical Baseline: Piketty’s data shows that extreme wealth concentration is actually the normal, default state of unregulated capitalism. The extreme inequalities of 19th-century Europe were only temporarily reduced by a massive, violent anomaly: the shock of World War I, the Great Depression, and World War II. [1, 2, 3]

The Nature of the Adjustment: Piketty does not theorize that capital concentration naturally triggers a self-correcting market crash that beautifully resets the board. Rather, he warns that if \(r > g\) continues unchecked, the resulting inequality will eventually trigger social and geopolitical catastrophes—such as total wars, hyperinflation, state collapse, or violent revolutions—that physically destroy capital. [1, 2, 3]

The Proposed Alternative: Because a natural “renormalization” means the violent destabilization of society, Piketty argues for an artificial, peaceful adjustment: a progressive global wealth tax and strict democratic control over capital. [1, 2]

3. The Austrian School’s View of the Same Crisis

Interestingly, Ludwig von Mises and the Austrian school would look at your exact scenario—high public debt, ossified corporate boards, and protected shareholders—and agree that a catastrophic crash is inevitable, but they would blame a different culprit.

Not a Capitalist Crisis: Mises would argue that this is not a crisis of free-market capitalism, but a crisis of corporatism or interventionism.

The Artificial Life Support: In a pure market, the “plutonomy” would be destroyed by their own bad bets. They only ossify because the state issues public debt to bail them out, artificially holding interest rates low.

The Crack-Up Boom: Mises theorized that using public debt and fiat money printing to perpetually protect an ossified elite eventually triggers a “crack-up boom” (Katastrophenhausse). The currency collapses entirely, resulting in a systemic economic reset.

Summary: The Ultimate Convergence

You have pinpointed the exact point where economics meets the study of history:

Extreme Capital Concentration ──> Elite Interlocking Networks

Political Capture ──> Use of Public Debt to Protect Elite Assets

Stagnation & Rigidity (Toynbee’s Civilizational Ossification)

Violent External Shock / Macroeconomic Reset (Piketty’s Renormalization)

When an economy is structured to ensure that a specific group of people can never lose, the economic forms lose the flexibility required to survive reality. The ultimate “adjustment” is rarely a clean market correction; history shows it is usually a structural breaking point for the civilization itself.

If you are interested, we can look at specific historical periods that suffered this exact combination of public debt, wealth concentration, and elite ossification—such as late-stage Bourbon France or the late Roman Republic—to see how their resets played out. Which historical era would you like to examine?”

Gary– It is the establishment of power in wealth concentration and continuity of corporate transitions that are the problem. One might argue that they slowly evolve, yet it is unreasonable to speculate that they might evolve themselves out of business , wealth and power- so they retain the same axiology or value theory in regard to the actual meaning of capital and what comprises capital values. For instance, if social well being for all were to be the highest value, and capital was elevating that state through ecological restoration and business that promote ecological economic progress, that would be generally in conflict with the present capital system’s value theory

Gemini– You have identified the core philosophical axiom of modern political economy: a system cannot voluntarily evolve to prioritize values that require its own deconstruction [1].

The modern financial system operates on an axiology (value theory) rooted in a specific definition of capital: capital is a self-valorizing asset that must seek continuous quantitative expansion, measured in monetary terms. Under this framework, social well-being or ecological restoration are viewed as external to the system—”externalities” that are only accounted for if they can be commodified or monetized [1].

When you look at this conflict through the lens of economic theory, three distinct perspectives emerge on why this axiology persists and how it interacts with structural evolution.

1. The Value Theory Conflict: Neoliberalism vs. Ecological Economics

Your example of defining capital values through ecological economic progress highlights a fundamental clash of economic frameworks:

  • The Dominant Axiology (Substituted Capital): Modern corporate finance operates on the principle of weak sustainability. This theory assumes that natural capital (the environment) and manufactured capital (factories, digital technology, financial assets) are perfectly substitutable. If an ecosystem is destroyed but financial capital grows by an equivalent or greater monetary amount, the system registers this as a net positive or “growth.”
  • The Ecological Axiology (Complementary Capital): Ecological economics argues for strong sustainability. It views natural capital and financial capital as completely non-substitutable. Financial capital is a subset of the human economy, which is a subset of a finite biosphere. In this view, destroying an ecosystem to expand digital digits on a bank ledger is an absolute destruction of value, regardless of what the corporate balance sheet says.

2. The Preservation of Power: Why Systems Don’t Evolve Inward

You noted that it is unreasonable to expect these elite networks to evolve themselves out of power. This is backed by a sociological concept known as The Iron Law of Oligarchy, formulated by Robert Michels.

The law states that all complex organizations—regardless of how democratic or idealistic they start—eventually develop into oligarchies. The individuals who rise to the top of corporate structures and interlocking boards do so precisely because they excel at navigating and optimizing the existing axiology (maximizing shareholder value).

Therefore, the continuity of corporate transitions acts as an ideological filter. A CEO who attempts to genuinely prioritize ecological restoration at the expense of quarterly capital expansion will be systematically replaced by the board or activist shareholders. The system is structurally engineered to self-correct against mutations that threaten capital accumulation.

3. Can the System Absorb the Conflict? (The Green Capitalist Attempt)

In recent decades, the corporate elite has attempted a superficial reconciliation of these values through frameworks like ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) investing and the “Stakeholder Capitalism” championed by the World Economic Forum.

However, critics from both the left and the right argue that this has not shifted the core axiology:

  • The Piketty/Marxist Critique: These efforts are viewed as sophisticated PR campaigns designed to stave off the political backlash or “renormalization” mentioned earlier. The fundamental goal remains the preservation of elite control and the compounding of capital; ecological goals are only pursued if they can generate a profitable market return.
  • The Misesian/Austrian Critique: This perspective argues that trying to force social well-being into corporate governance corrupts the only thing a market is actually good at: economic calculation based on consumer prices. They argue that if society values ecological restoration, consumers must change their purchasing habits or governments must enforce clear property rights against pollution, rather than expecting corporate bureaucrats to act as ad hoc social planners.

The Ultimate Paradox

Your premise leaves us with a stark conclusion: if the actual meaning of capital remains tied strictly to monetary expansion and elite continuity, then any true transition to an ecological economy cannot happen through the voluntary evolution of corporate boards. It would require a fundamental redefinition of property, value, and accounting metrics—a systemic shift that history suggests is rarely driven from the top down.

If you are interested, we can look into the legal and fiduciary duties of corporate boards (such as the history of shareholder primacy) to see how the legal system itself enforces this specific axiology. Would you like to explore that aspect?

Gary– Each of those would be interesting in summaries.

Gemini– Here are the concise summaries of the three areas you highlighted, outlining exactly how the legal system, historical precedents, and wealth-rotation data interact with this entrenched axiology.

1. Legal and Fiduciary Duties: How the Law Enforces Shareholder Primacy

The modern corporate board cannot voluntarily change its value theory because it is bound by a rigid legal framework that punishes deviation.

  • The Dodge v. Ford Precedent (1919): This foundational legal case established that a corporation is organized and operated primarily for the profit of the stockholders. When Henry Ford tried to halt special dividends to lower car prices and employ more workers, the court ruled that he could not treat a corporation as a semi-philanthropic institution.
  • The Revlon Duties: In corporate law, when a company enters a sale or merger scenario, the board’s fiduciary duty narrows down exclusively to one single goal: maximizing the immediate financial value for shareholders.
  • The Threat of Litigation: If a corporate board chooses to pass on a highly profitable venture because it causes ecological degradation (which is legal under current regulations), shareholders can sue the board members personally for a breach of fiduciary duty. The legal system structurally mandates that monetary capital extraction takes precedence over social utility.

2. Historical Precedents: The “Resets” of Elite Ossification

When an elite network successfully ossifies and refuses to adapt its axiology, history shows that the system does not gently evolve; it breaks.

  • Late Bourbon France (1789): The French aristocracy and clergy (the First and Second Estates) held the vast majority of the wealth and sat on the powerful regional courts (parlements). They consistently blocked tax reforms that would ease the burden on the starving lower classes, using their institutional power to protect their wealth. The system lacked the flexibility to self-correct, leading directly to the violent reset of the French Revolution.
  • The Late Roman Republic (1st Century BCE): The Roman Senate became a de facto plutocracy, where a highly interconnected web of patrician families controlled the vast agricultural estates (latifundia) worked by slaves. They blocked all attempts at land reform (such as those proposed by the Gracchi brothers), assassinating the reformers to maintain their wealth. This absolute institutional rigidity caused decades of civil war, ultimately destroying the Republic and giving rise to the autocratic Roman Empire.

3. Data on Wealth Rotation: Does the 1% Actually Cycle?

To see if the elite network is truly permanent, economists track whether the families at the top remain there over generations.

  • The “Florentine Surprises”: A famous study by economists Guglielmo Barone and Sauro Mocetti tracked wealth in Florence, Italy, from 1427 to 2011. They found that the wealthiest taxpayers today are the exact same families who were at the top six centuries ago. Despite centuries of wars, political shifts, and economic changes, the elite network successfully preserved its structural continuity.
  • The Modern U.S. Reality: While there is short-term volatility—billionaires frequently move up and down the Forbes list due to tech booms—the broader structural concentration remains intact. Research shows that while the individuals inside the top 1% might shift slightly from decade to decade, the interlocking institutions (the elite universities, asset management firms, and corporate board structures) ensure that the wealth itself stays concentrated within the same narrow demographic and class network.

14 May 2026

Aretaic Ethics and Practical Effects of Overly-Concentrated Wealth

Philosophers classically favored aretaic ethics—those centered on virtue. For me, investors like Warren Buffett seem somewhat immoral. Overly concentrated wealth harms real competition. Very large investors hold such a vast financial advantage over the majority that new ideas and inventions struggle to emerge from the bottom up. Inventive ideas actually and are effectively co-opted and siphoned up to the wealthy. It is important for the health of free enterprise to prevent excessive concentration of capital—especially since concentrated wealth so heavily influences politics.

The top 1% own about 30% of American wealth, the top 20% own roughly 80%, and the bottom 80% of people own just 15%. Because even congressional elections are extremely costly—averaging between $2.5 million and $8 million for House winners, and about $27 million for a U.S. Senate seat—the ability to fund campaigns and shape political influence is decisive. Plainly, 80% of the people have limited ability to sway federal campaigns when advertisers and media are largely bought and paid for by the wealthy. The public sector is allowed and even encouraged to compile vast debt. The debt is owned by the wealthy and permits rhetoric in support of cutting public services.

Capital multiplies faster than wages, so wealth concentrates and the majority become politically powerless. I support limiting the amount of capital an individual can own to a reasonable percentage of the market’s total value, national wealth, and the nation’s median income. When too many people have AI algorithms executing light-speed trading, manual labor and ordinary work become trivial pursuits compared to the advantages enjoyed by those who own capital. Since the end of the Cold War, wages have risen about 30% while Wall Street gains have soared roughly 2,800%. The profit has gone overwhelmingly to the top 10% or so. Perhaps those with a morally sound outlook simply do not wish to make multiplying capital their primary occupation.

I once took one of those online IQ tests. I invested my time in reading books on history and philosophy instead of buying gold stocks… so now I need to work for a living rather than watch a portfolio grow while sipping Mai Tais on a tropical beach.



06 May 2026

Concentrating A.I. and Capital

 Building a frontier, top-tier A.I. next year will cost more than a billion dollars. Because A.I. is becoming increasingly powerful every day in regard to the economy, the question of who owns those costly A.I.s  is somewhat comparable to the question of who owns the most concentrated capital in the world. There are practical questions of the social impact of large language models and how they are trained politically, for those outlooks embedded in software algorithms will influence billions of people on sundry issues. The normative A.I. training parameters will train humans indirectly too.

Questions of national sovereignty in relation to A.I. ownership and operator’s nationality are also meaningful. Few would be comfortable today in the United States if China were to be the sole provider of A.I. for the United States. For that matter at least half the country would not be comfortable with Democrats ruling A.I. development. Political and power orientation of A.I. might induce some creative thought about its social effect on the populus. Would one want the government or Wall Street to be the sole providers of A.I. access?

https://fortune.com/2026/05/06/39-trillion-national-debt-fix-ai-productivity-yale-budget-lab/

Real employee wages have increased about 30% since the end of the Cold War. The growth of Wall Street has increased about 3800%. Information concentration is going the same way in regard to corporate information vs that of ordinary people.  Information about ordinary people obtained by A.I. compared to information ordinary people have about corporate proprietary information is also asymmetric. Concentrated wealth of such an extreme degree as concentrated A.I.seems unAmerican. A.I. power concentrated in a few corporations is entirely accepted though, and at least rarely considered by the majority of society. There may be consequences of that.

Here is some data on A.I. today.

https://hai.stanford.edu/ai-index/2026-ai-index-report/technical-performance

Gemini- Training a top-tier "frontier" AI model (like GPT-4, Gemini Ultra, or Grok 3) costs over \(\$100\text{–}200\) million in computing power alone as of 2024–2025, with costs projected to exceed \(\$1\) billion by 2027. Very few exist—roughly 5 to 10 truly top-tier frontier models exist globally, dominated by companies like OpenAI, Google, Anthropic, and xAI. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]

Cost of Frontier AI Setup

  • Training Costs: Training a frontier model requires massive, specialized computing clusters. Estimated training costs for flagship models are immense: GPT-4 was estimated at \(\$78\text{–}100+\) million, while Google's Gemini Ultra was around \(\$191\) million.
  • API Usage Costs (2026): For users accessing these models via API, pricing is structured by tokens.
    • Claude 4 Opus: \(\$15.00\) input / \(\$75.00\) output per million tokens.
    • Gemini 2.5 Pro: \(\$1.25\text{–}2.50\) input / \(\$10\text{–}15\) output per million tokens.
    • Grok 3/4: \(\sim\$3.00\) input / \(\$15.00\) output per million tokens.
  • Consumer Subscription Costs:
    • Grok SuperGrok: \(\$30\text{/month}\).
    • ChatGPT Pro: \(\$100\text{–}200\text{/month}\).
    • Gemini Advanced (Ultra): \(\sim\$250\text{/month}\). [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]

Number of Existing Frontier Models

The number of truly "frontier" models—those setting the state-of-the-art—is extremely low due to the high barrier to entry. [1, 2, 3]

  • Core Actors: The main players are OpenAI (GPT-4o/5), Google (Gemini Ultra/Pro), Anthropic (Claude Opus/Sonnet), and xAI (Grok).
  • Estimated Count: Only a handful of organizations currently possess the computational resources (\(\text{>10,000s}\) of GPUs) and capital to train these models, resulting in fewer than 10-15 distinct flagship, truly leading-edge models globally, though many more "near-frontier" models are emerging. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]

Note: Cost and capability estimates are based on industry trends as of early 2026

As of mid-2026, the U.S. generally leads in top-tier, proprietary AI model performance, but China has rapidly closed the gap, nearly erasing the U.S. advantage through highly efficient, open-source models. While American models like Anthropic’s Claude Opus 4.6 maintain a narrow edge in advanced reasoning, Chinese models like DeepSeek R1 and Alibaba’s Qwen often provide 90% of the capability at 10% of the cost, making them highly competitive. [1, 2, 3, 4]

Key Differences in the AI Race:

  • Performance vs. Efficiency: U.S. models often win on raw power and capability (e.g., GPT-4, Claude). China has shown incredible ability to create highly optimized models that are cheaper and, through open-source approaches, often more accessible for customization.
  • Hardware and Compute: The U.S. retains a substantial advantage in total compute, backed by immense capital expenditures from firms like Microsoft, Alphabet, Amazon, and Meta. China faces constraints due to U.S. chip export controls but excels in utilizing “mature” chips for inference.
  • Open Source Dominance: Chinese firms are dominating the open-weight model space, providing top-tier alternatives that are heavily used globally.
  • Application Areas: The U.S. leads in software-based AI applications, while China often takes the edge in AI “bodies” (robotics, drones) and industrial application, supported by heavy government subsidies. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]

The Gap Is Closing
By March 2026, the performance gulf in chatbot “Arena scores” had shrunk to just 39 points, a significant drop from the vast, year-over-year lead previously held by the U.S.. The consensus is that while the U.S. holds a slight edge in foundational innovation, China is an equal, if not superior, competitor in efficiency and specialized implementation. [1, 2, 3]

Top 20 AI Models Ranking (May 2026)
Rank [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]Model NameOwner / DeveloperPerformance Score (%)
1Gemini 3.1 Pro PreviewGoogle DeepMind96.1%
2Claude Opus 4.7Anthropic94.2%
3GPT-5.5OpenAI93.1%
4GPT-5.4 ProOpenAI92.8%
5Claude Mythos PreviewAnthropic~92.5%*
6Gemini 3.1 ProGoogle DeepMind87.0%
7Grok-4.20 ExpertxAI (Elon Musk)~86.5%*
8Llama 4 MaverickMeta~85.8%*
9Claude Opus 4.6Anthropic85.0%
10Qwen 3Alibaba Group~84.2%*
11DeepSeek-V3DeepSeek (Liang Wenfeng)78.2%
12Mistral 3Mistral AI~77.8%*
13Ernie 5.0Baidu~77.1%*
14Kimi-K2 InstructMoonshot AI~76.5%*
15Gemma 3:12bGoogle DeepMind~75.4%*
16Command R4Cohere~74.2%*
17Llama 3.1 405BMeta75.4%
18Codex 2OpenAI~72.1%*
19Claude CodeAnthropic~71.8%*
20Reflection-2Reflection AI~70.5%*