Like American Democrats who increasingly assert an inherent right to censor politically incorrect language on social media—particularly speech deemed offensive or constituting hate speech against their constituents—the European Union has followed a similar trajectory. The EU is moving toward formalized censorship, repression, and the establishment of AI-mediated editorial systems, alongside hate-speech laws that criminalize pejorative or politically disfavored language and concepts.
To live in Europe and publicly characterize pro-war leadership in government as fascist may now involve real personal or legal risk. One cannot write effective witness history if one must constantly guard against censorship, professional sanction, or criminal exposure imposed by partisan insiders policing language. When the words used to describe power are themselves constrained, historical truth is pre-shaped before it can be recorded.
In some respects, the EU is on a trajectory toward becoming another China, with military and economic priorities increasingly defined at the supranational level. It would be a mistake for U.S. political leaders to ignore the possibility that the post–Cold War EU will emerge in history not merely as an ally, but as a frenemy of the United States—at times a partner, at times a rival. The EU does not share the traditional free-speech absolutism or political assumptions embedded in the American founding.
The comparison to China is not intended as a claim about internal political structures or forms of governance. It is not a being-for-itself comparison. Rather, it concerns how the EU functions as a political entity for external observers and pragmatic actors on the world stage. As a consolidated bloc, the EU is increasingly acting in ways that render it functionally equivalent to China in several military and economic respects. Whatever internal pluralism exists within Europe, the EU increasingly presents itself outwardly as a unified actor, much like a nation-state. Even democracies, in moments of conflict, present a single sovereign face. Regardless of how a political entity arrives at its international posture, it ultimately speaks with one voice when acting in a sovereign capacity.
This matters because sovereignty, in practice, is defined less by internal debate than by the capacity to act coherently and impose outcomes externally. As the EU centralizes regulatory authority, coordinates military and economic policy, and asserts normative demands—including speech governance—it becomes a peer power bloc rather than a merely pluralistic association of states. In such a context, internal democratic diversity does little to mitigate external rivalry. A unified EU will pursue its own strategic interests, sometimes aligned with those of the United States and sometimes not, and American policy that assumes permanent alignment risks strategic miscalculation.
In a tripartite or multipolar world, Russia and the BRICS nations are likely to function as a swing bloc with considerable influence. If Russia were to move closer to the United States, that could offset European efforts to pressure the U.S. into following EU-led global economic or military policy, particularly as a nation increasingly reliant on NATO for security. Recent Democratic leadership has shown a willingness to defer to European consensus in these domains, a posture that may ultimately constrain American strategic autonomy.
