Why Did Some Regard Marx's Contradictions as of a Formal Logical Nature?

The effort to reduce Marxist dialectical materialism to formal logic is a wrong effort. The contradictions of Marxist dialectical materialism were posited to be of an historical nature-rather like a Toynbean challenge-response criteria describing evolving phases of cycles of civilization.

The meaningful aspects of dialectical materialism if there are any, are as an historical description of diction and contra-diction rather than of the abstract idea that p and not-p may exist concurrently.

Democrats say that Obama has improved the economy a little-Republicans say phooey, he has made it worse and thus a diction and contradiction have been acceptably presented.

One ought to narrow down the meaning of terms like dialectical materialism and seperate that particular one from Hegel's notion of dialectical spiritual evolution. Marx contra-dicted Hegel's idea of the world as a dialectical spiritual presentation making the evolution materially based. That contra-diction was for Marx o.k.

Marx as a student of Hegel exploited the idea of dialectical or progressive evolutionary change in a sociological and historical context. Marx did not have much concern about writing any sort of logic-and Frege was yet ahead in time a bit and beyond Marx's philosophical vision. Marx was concerned with real politics and hostory and less concerned with scientifically describing a meta-physics as might Democritus.

Since Marx was fundamentally wrong about dialectical materialism-there are more than two physical forces at work in the Universe today plus dark energy and whatever else even though ultimately everything that appears pluralistic may be contingent upon monism of The One, it become retroactively theoretical, or perhaps necessary to construct a hypothetical dialectical material logic for academic purposes if one wants to model a theory of meaning of contradictions that Marx may be credited with yet did not have.