Multiverse Theory and A Prioricity

This comment on a few aspects of multiverse theory and its epistemological criterion as a priori thought isn’t intended to seem technically rigorous. It is a few ideas I post here as notes.

Considering Kripke’s ‘Naming and Necessity written in 1973 and its salient comments upon a prioricity and necessary truths in reference to modal logical representations and all possible worlds paradigms of testing for validity one has the opportunity to plug in some of Kripke’s ideas and those of Quine to the paradigm of constructions of super-string theory, M-Theory and of all possible universes.

‘Naming and Necessity’ continued the analytic philosophical consideration of the meaning of names phenomenally. Kripke of course also considers various mathematical examples shedding light upon the problem of Kantian philosophical epistemology in regard to analytic and necessary truths. Quine also worked in the philosophical area of exposition of the phenomenal meaning of names within a language and for-themselves. Kripke points out a paper by Searle on names as a family of references. I think that might be regarding names as an address reference of meaning within a given lexicon.

Names and the meaning of a particular name are/is a kind of address or lexical location or description that differs for oneself and for-others. While there may be several people named Gary Gibson, there is only one other known to me who is a writer of science fiction, so Gary Gibson as a reference to find me with an Internet search turns up the other Gary Gibson as he is a more prolific writer, and of a more literary disposition. I thus differentiate myself on Internet and other reference categories with the use of middle initial ‘C.’ to provide additional clarification of the proper address reference. There are dozens of Gary Gibson provided with Internet searches, and more specific address criteria might be needed to provided reference individuation.

Names may be taken as descriptions of reference objects in space-time with temporal variability and relativity. For some reason mathematical and geometrical thought-objects and processes of a temporal character with change and series or progressions as aspects of their status as objects named that can be regarded as a priori truths, or constructions of an imaginary character existing at least once that have internal construction characteristics that are compressible and repeatable or extendible, in theory, in a postulated manner necessarily on each occasion per iteration ad infinitum, are given a status of a prioricity truth of a different nature than a posteriori truths. Analytic truths seem to be of a more tautological construction given that the terms are defined within a lexicon relevant to one world. All possible worlds paradigms for testing the necessity of truths seem to be improbable if a theory of names is founded as a description of a kind.

Names as descriptions would seem logically to have validity with synthetic a priori judgments or the a posteriori rather than in extending a priori truths into the realm of the empirical world. We are interested in the topic because of the pursuit of truth in cosmological physical theory.

A posteriori truths might be useful references to the motions of the planets around the sun within Newtonian, Einsteinean or MOG theory criteria. A priori truths or mathematical motion and quantum models of hypothetical space-time, Hilbert space or Tegmarkian all possible universes derivatives etc. are phenomenal descriptions regarded as true so much as they effectively coincide in various ways with testing and predictions. If we were ancient mariners sailing with a navigator relying on dead reckoning of tides and judgment of colors of the sea and sky for course corrections we would not expect perfect accuracy in prediction of current flows and weather, neither do we expect our theory of the construction of the universe or of all possible universe to be flawless. Instead we recognize that the names and constructions of models and facts are something like the most reliable descriptions we can provide of experience and mechanics regarding a given phenomena that might be improved with deeper and different analysis.

What of the relationship of a priori truths constructed or revealed to the mind, and all possible universes of math or logical theory regarding necessity, and the [potential reality of an infinite number of universes?

Kripke point out that an infinite mind might be able to test and prove or disprove the truth of particular mathematical conjectures; we would expect that an infinite mind could as well prove or disprove the existence of an infinite number of universes.

The relationship between a prior constructions that represent algorithms or mathematical compressibility of mathematical descriptions of a universe and its history, present and future evolutions, and the actual universe must seemingly be a necessary relationship of subjective epistemology and a priori thought that is in practice converted through association with observation into the synthetic a priori. Perhaps when speculative ideas are tested with real world observations the kind of truth constructed is that of analytic judgments and description-meaning sets combined with experience to render a posteriori truths.

It is notable that all of these a priori truths combined in some way with experience yield truths contingent upon no further and transforming physical observations that would conflict with the criterion of application. Ongoing cosmological theories with a large portion of a priori theory such as a multiverse or infinite number of universes in time, space, sequence and so forth are descriptions with a meaning perhaps existentially a priori falsifiable through a posteriori judgments.

Well, this perhaps thoroughly muddies up the clarity of the relationship of a prioricity, infinite series and universes of model logic to that of cosmological theory models of the multiverse from an epistemological perspective, as well as that of the actual existence or non-existence of a multiverse; I did say though, that it is just a note on the subject.