Subjectivity of Language and Truth Values

 I was conversing with Gemini about the limits of LLMs since they are based on human language, and human language is just an approximation-perhaps statistically founded, on what is perceived. There is no direct relation between word and object such that the language has an element of realism about it. Various languages have different words of the experience of a red apple, and to some individuals it might even correlate with fear (perhaps Newton was traumatized being hit in the head with an apple).

There isn't much doubt that some academics since Dewey have said that truth is subjective. If language is subjective the statement has some truth about it. Language has a pragmatic basis though. People are free to reject truth where it is necessary and to be stupid if they prefer. Logic is a way of structuring analysis, and some don't like analytic philosophy either.

I liked Ian Sterwart's Flatland and the sequel Flatterland: Like Flatland, Only More So. Logic seems fine with n dimensions though. Maybe one could add new logic methods. Logic isn't geometry or cosmology. Euclidean and Riemannian geometry are equally not logic, which isn't math. People will argue about trans-finite numbers and infinity, the void and noumena, yet the known is the sole realm one knows and that goes for logic too- not a reason to be dismissive. One can only examine where one is-like prisoners on the floor of Plato's cave. Because there may well be somewhere else than the known Universe- even if that realm is God's , that does not mean that knowledge of where one is, is meaningless.

Here is a list of people that have supported the subjectivity of truth values provide by ChatGPT; "Since John Dewey, several academics, particularly in postmodernist and pragmatist traditions, have argued that truth is subjective or at least socially constructed. Some key figures include:

Richard Rorty (1931–2007) – A neopragmatist heavily influenced by Dewey, Rorty rejected the idea of objective truth, arguing instead that truth is what a given community finds useful to believe. He saw truth as a product of language and social practice rather than an objective correspondence with reality.

Thomas Kuhn (1922–1996) – While not directly arguing that truth is subjective, Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) suggested that scientific paradigms determine what is considered true, implying that truth is relative to historical and social contexts.

Michel Foucault (1926–1984) – Foucault explored how knowledge and truth are shaped by power structures, arguing that truth is historically contingent and constructed through discourse rather than an objective reality.

Jean-François Lyotard (1924–1998) – In The Postmodern Condition (1979), Lyotard critiqued grand narratives and universal claims to truth, suggesting that truth is localized, contextual, and shaped by language games.

Bruno Latour (1947–2022) – A key figure in Science and Technology Studies (STS), Latour argued that scientific facts are constructed through networks of human and non-human actors, challenging the idea of objective truth.

Jacques Derrida (1930–2004) – Derrida’s deconstruction challenged the stability of meaning in language, implying that truth is always deferred and contingent upon interpretation."

Nelson Goodman (1906–1998) – In Ways of World making (1978), Goodman argued that truth depends on the conceptual frameworks we construct, suggesting multiple “right” descriptions of reality rather than one objective truth."

Plainly the notion that truth values are entirely and invariably subjective is useful to politicians who prefer lies and deceit. I believe they misunderstand the context of subjectivity for reasons of personal utility and positive reward for dismissing objective truth.

It may be that some people don’t understand the paradigm of subjective and objective distinctions for language and perception; they differ from one another.

'Individuals' and 'Word and Object'

Strawson and Quine’s books in the analytic philosophy tradition did not, as I recall, venture into logicism. Each were about propositions and the subject-object distinction, intentional and extensional thought, about the relationship of propositions to perceptions. They struck me as very intense psychological-analytical applications of Kant’s categories of thought; not as just categories within mind, and not the same categories, instead as very subtle descriptions of what propositional thought is and how it relates to the ’empirical’.

It's just reason and work. Subtle yet plain. . I.M.O. the works I mentioned are simply rationalism continuing the investigation of thought started by Descartes. It was a natural development and a period in the history of philosophy they moved through. Quine held the Edgar Pierce Chair of Philosophy at Harvard a quarter century. What Strawson and Quine developed was a major contribution to western thought.

Analytic Philosophy Functions Well

Analytic philosophy such as Quine, Kripke et al produced is the opposite of babble-speak. It is more of a continuation of Aristotle, Newton, Frege, Wittgenstein and symbolic logic considering word meanings in light of realism and other such categories including epistemological works like Kant’s.

That coursera.org course on Kierkegaard and Socratic Irony is fascinating for one interested in peripatetic philosophers and a point of view shared with Kierkegaard considering Hegel’s influence on German Romanticism and examining society as objectively as Nietzsche’s Zarathustra. If it’s not broke don’t fix