Why Compromise and Innovation are Better than Confrontation for Ukraine

Compromise rather than conflict is the better course for Ukraine. Sanctions and bellicose Washington D.C. rhetoric about Russian aggression accompanied with sanctions dividing Russian and European trade and commerce ought to be replaced with realpolitik. It is better to integrate Russian-European economics rather than segregate. It is better to make closer security and trade ties trilaterally with Russia, Europe and the U.S.A. instead of increasing isolation and sanctions. When it is possible with intelligent leadership to innovate progress instead of regressing to primitive cold war posturing one should choose the smart way rather than the dumb.

Ukraine is unlikely to be harmed by making of itself something of a political laboratory for creative political merger accentuating positive, closer ties with Russia and the west simultaneously. Creative political thought did not need to die with the passing of Reagan-Gorbachev era.

Obama administration sycophants complain about the European economy slowing U.S. economic growth as if the sanctions hurting European and Russian economies haven’t anything to do with Europe’s stagnant recovery from the 2008 banking and mortgage crash largely developed through Wall Street and British, D.C. and London deregulation and failure to govern high-speed quantitative trading and packaging of bad debt for sale.

The Obama administration’s failure to comprehend Russia’s 1200 year patrimony of the Ukraine and the unlikely circumstance of a complete acceptance of de-Russification of Ukraine means that the economic and security stumbling block will continue indefinitely even if with a cold war level of simmering maneuver. That is quite different from warm and innovative relations between Europe, the United States and Russia-and that is bad for the economy of the three regions.

The reality of Ukraine permits far more real interaction and adjustment of political formality than the abstract ideological and partisan positions that Washington and its puppet politicians believe possible. The confrontational Washington attitude does not save Ukraine from a return to the evil empire of the Soviet Union. It is quite possible for Ukrainian pluralism to include Russian interests and Ukrainian politicians with very close ties to Russia as well as the west. Ukrainian interests are in drawing benefits from east and west rather than just the west or the east. They have no need of an exclusive relationship to one side or the other beyond its borders, and neither need Ukrainian independence mean being free of affiliations and treaties with anyone beyond its borders.

Ukraine might sight trade agreements with Russia and the west simultaneously-even some of those free trade agreements that Washington leapt into as if they were the opulent new designer economic drug. Ukraine can be the state where synthetic development and inclusion of Russian-leaning separatist regions in their own Ukrainian community of independent state can satisfy the real desire for many to be more Russian culturally than western while west leaning interests can be confident of free trade, freedom of religion and security interests not being taken over by a Russian mafia or onerous policies repressing civil rights.

It is often said that most Ukrainians want democracy and a free economy, yet so do many Russians and Europeans. Realpolitik of history shows that tribal and cultural wars are right up there with wars and conflicts created by aristocracy and royalty over land. Keeping the ordinary citizen free of class caste systems isn’t easy-even the power of concentrated wealth and their media pets make it challenging for some to recognize their loss of earnings power and degradation of comparative social advantage.

Ukraine should seek its own balance in Fullerian social synthetic integration-syntegrity between Russia and Europe innovating new political structures to bring in closer Russian economic and cultural participation while drawing in the west as well. The major sticking point in getting the sanction repealed swiftly is the need for political change away from confrontationism and bellicosity with stark, de trop, black-white us and them paradigmata for ultimatums. Moving through a variety of Ukrainian political evolutions toward a realpolitik of mergism is not only possible, it is a necessary way to move economic progress forward, reduce European tension in the region and return the focus of Europe toward rebuilding the economic malaise that is still severe in several members of the EC.