Paul Tillich's 1925 essays on religion and the philosophy of religion are worthwhile reading for those that progress in philosophical readings along a normal course of classical and 20th century philosophy inclusive of linguistic and analytical thought. It is implicitly contradictory for the dynamic subjectivists to posit anything objectively meaningful about an experience they regard as fiction.
With that 20th century course of philosophical development one moves from the Frege, Russell and Vienna Circle to empiricism and the post-empiricism of Quine, Strawson, Kripke and others. Early on there was a rival school of thought such as Dewey represented that Tillich could regard as the pragmatic school of thought. Deweian pragmatism is quite different than that of Charles S. Pierce.
Tillich was able to associate various worldviews of religion into three primary ontological paradigms all of which were somewhat exclusive of the others. The critical analytic world-view included science and was empirical, the phenomenological sought the essences things-perhaps more of a Platonic direction, and the pragmatic had what is for the purpose of this brief essay the most interesting point of view.
Today one finds the pragmatic point of view-also known as dynamic subjectivism to be a common populist-elitist party belief. The belief is those concepts are fundamentally meaningless manifestations of human beingness with no transcending value. Though ideas or words and objects may correlate meaningfully, that correlation is entirely a result of ontological relativism in which words and meanings assigned by usage are coincidental. The dynamic subjectivist point of view is that there are no truths of a Platonic sort and is of course irreligious.
Yet dynamic subjectivism can regard all human though and experience as a kind of fiction-even religious beliefs are regarded as fictions of human construction equivalent to every other concept made by human beings. Those concepts are valued for their utility rather than for potentially apprehending some kind of a mystic, transcendental or self-standing truth for-itself.
Tillich wrote that the pragmatists seek to strengthen human experience and circumstance, yet since they believe human concepts are entirely fictions they also believe that perpetual change of thought content is good in-itself if it has some pragmatic value for making the human circumstance better. Of course the values of good, evil or better are entirely subjective and fictitious too. One could not develop a good theory of utilitarianism on the foundation of dynamic subjectivism.
So I suppose I should write something about the phenomenology that Tillich describes. Beyond superficial descriptions of things-for-themselves the phenomenologists pursue the essents that support being. The neo-Platonist philosopher Plotinus took that sort of approach I think, yet Tillich was reading considering Husserl and Heidegger perhaps as much.
Contemporary quantum mechanics makes it easier to consider the essents or particle fields that make up things like automobiles and eagles then in 1925. Leibniz' spiritual monads are another approach to describing the essence of things, yet for Tillich I believe another course existed-that of meta-logic and the investigation of meaning in reality.
Reality-meaning would be something different from the critical-analytical, phenomenological or pragmatic weltanschauungs (world views). Though many on the pragmatists develop from a critical analytic background, they leave that off to pursue their epistemological Zen of meaninglessness. That subjective epistemology choice is self-limiting.
One cannot be satisfied with the ideology that there is no such thing as the real world and that we must rise above it. The human experience of the world is temporal and with much potential for philosophical development-even beyond this Universe, and that is what are religious faith is about; faith in Jesus Christ the way to the Unconditional.
-- Updated August 1st, 2012, 1:16 pm to add the following --
Paul Tillich's 1925 essays on religion and the philosophy of religion are worthwhile reading for those that progress in philosophical readings along a normal course of classical and 20th century philosophy inclusive of linguistic and analytical thought. It is implicitly contradictory for the dynamic subjectivists to posit anything objectively meaningful about an experience they regard as fiction.
With that 20th century course of philosophical development one moves from the Frege, Russell and Vienna Circle to empiricism and the post-empiricism of Quine, Strawson, Kripke and others. Early on there was a rival school of thought such as Dewey represented that Tillich could regard as the pragmatic school of thought. Deweian pragmatism is quite different than that of Charles S. Pierce.
Tillich was able to associate various worldviews of religion into three primary ontological paradigms all of which were somewhat exclusive of the others. The critical analytic world-view included science and was empirical, the phenomenological sought the essences things-perhaps more of a Platonic direction, and the pragmatic had what is for the purpose of this brief essay the most interesting point of view.
Today one finds the pragmatic point of view-also known as dynamic subjectivism to be a common populist-elitist party belief. The belief is those concepts are fundamentally meaningless manifestations of human beingness with no transcending value. Though ideas or words and objects may correlate meaningfully, that correlation is entirely a result of ontological relativism in which words and meanings assigned by usage are coincidental. The dynamic subjectivist point of view is that there are no truths of a Platonic sort and is of course irreligious.
Yet dynamic subjectivism can regard all human though and experience as a kind of fiction-even religious beliefs are regarded as fictions of human construction equivalent to every other concept made by human beings. Those concepts are valued for their utility rather than for potentially apprehending some kind of a mystic, transcendental or self-standing truth for-itself.
Tillich wrote that the pragmatists seek to strengthen human experience and circumstance, yet since they believe human concepts are entirely fictions they also believe that perpetual change of thought content is good in-itself if it has some pragmatic value for making the human circumstance better. Of course the values of good, evil or better are entirely subjective and fictitious too. One could not develop a good theory of utilitarianism on the foundation of dynamic subjectivism.
So I suppose I should write something about the phenomenology that Tillich describes. Beyond superficial descriptions of things-for-themselves the phenomenologists pursue the essents that support being. The neo-Platonist philosopher Plotinus took that sort of approach I think, yet Tillich was reading considering Husserl and Heidegger perhaps as much.
Contemporary quantum mechanics makes it easier to consider the essents or particle fields that make up things like automobiles and eagles then in 1925. Leibniz' spiritual monads are another approach to describing the essence of things, yet for Tillich I believe another course existed-that of meta-logic and the investigation of meaning in reality.
Reality-meaning would be something different from the critical-analytical, phenomenological or pragmatic weltanschauungs (world views). Though many on the pragmatists develop from a critical analytic background, they leave that off to pursue their epistemological Zen of meaninglessness. That subjective epistemology choice is self-limiting.
One cannot be satisfied with the ideology that there is no such thing as the real world and that we must rise above it. The human experience of the world is temporal and with much potential for philosophical development-even beyond this Universe, and that is what are religious faith is about; faith in Jesus Christ the way to the Unconditional.
-- Updated August 1st, 2012, 1:16 pm to add the following --
Paul Tillich's 1925 essays on religion and the philosophy of religion are worthwhile reading for those that progress in philosophical readings along a normal course of classical and 20th century philosophy inclusive of linguistic and analytical thought. It is implicitly contradictory for the dynamic subjectivists to posit anything objectively meaningful about an experience they regard as fiction.
With that 20th century course of philosophical development one moves from the Frege, Russell and Vienna Circle to empiricism and the post-empiricism of Quine, Strawson, Kripke and others. Early on there was a rival school of thought such as Dewey represented that Tillich could regard as the pragmatic school of thought. Deweian pragmatism is quite different than that of Charles S. Pierce.
Tillich was able to associate various worldviews of religion into three primary ontological paradigms all of which were somewhat exclusive of the others. The critical analytic world-view included science and was empirical, the phenomenological sought the essences things-perhaps more of a Platonic direction, and the pragmatic had what is for the purpose of this brief essay the most interesting point of view.
Today one finds the pragmatic point of view-also known as dynamic subjectivism to be a common populist-elitist party belief. The belief is those concepts are fundamentally meaningless manifestations of human beingness with no transcending value. Though ideas or words and objects may correlate meaningfully, that correlation is entirely a result of ontological relativism in which words and meanings assigned by usage are coincidental. The dynamic subjectivist point of view is that there are no truths of a Platonic sort and is of course irreligious.
Yet dynamic subjectivism can regard all human though and experience as a kind of fiction-even religious beliefs are regarded as fictions of human construction equivalent to every other concept made by human beings. Those concepts are valued for their utility rather than for potentially apprehending some kind of a mystic, transcendental or self-standing truth for-itself.
Tillich wrote that the pragmatists seek to strengthen human experience and circumstance, yet since they believe human concepts are entirely fictions they also believe that perpetual change of thought content is good in-itself if it has some pragmatic value for making the human circumstance better. Of course the values of good, evil or better are entirely subjective and fictitious too. One could not develop a good theory of utilitarianism on the foundation of dynamic subjectivism.
So I suppose I should write something about the phenomenology that Tillich describes. Beyond superficial descriptions of things-for-themselves the phenomenologists pursue the essents that support being. The neo-Platonist philosopher Plotinus took that sort of approach I think, yet Tillich was reading considering Husserl and Heidegger perhaps as much.
Contemporary quantum mechanics makes it easier to consider the essents or particle fields that make up things like automobiles and eagles then in 1925. Leibniz' spiritual monads are another approach to describing the essence of things, yet for Tillich I believe another course existed-that of meta-logic and the investigation of meaning in reality.
Reality-meaning would be something different from the critical-analytical, phenomenological or pragmatic weltanschauungs (world views). Though many on the pragmatists develop from a critical analytic background, they leave that off to pursue their epistemological Zen of meaninglessness. That subjective epistemology choice is self-limiting.
One cannot be satisfied with the ideology that there is no such thing as the real world and that we must rise above it. The human experience of the world is temporal and with much potential for philosophical development-even beyond this Universe, and that is what are religious faith is about; faith in Jesus Christ the way to the Unconditional.
-- Updated August 1st, 2012, 1:16 pm to add the following --
Paul Tillich's 1925 essays on religion and the philosophy of religion are worthwhile reading for those that progress in philosophical readings along a normal course of classical and 20th century philosophy inclusive of linguistic and analytical thought. It is implicitly contradictory for the dynamic subjectivists to posit anything objectively meaningful about an experience they regard as fiction.
With that 20th century course of philosophical development one moves from the Frege, Russell and Vienna Circle to empiricism and the post-empiricism of Quine, Strawson, Kripke and others. Early on there was a rival school of thought such as Dewey represented that Tillich could regard as the pragmatic school of thought. Deweian pragmatism is quite different than that of Charles S. Pierce.
Tillich was able to associate various worldviews of religion into three primary ontological paradigms all of which were somewhat exclusive of the others. The critical analytic world-view included science and was empirical, the phenomenological sought the essences things-perhaps more of a Platonic direction, and the pragmatic had what is for the purpose of this brief essay the most interesting point of view.
Today one finds the pragmatic point of view-also known as dynamic subjectivism to be a common populist-elitist party belief. The belief is those concepts are fundamentally meaningless manifestations of human beingness with no transcending value. Though ideas or words and objects may correlate meaningfully, that correlation is entirely a result of ontological relativism in which words and meanings assigned by usage are coincidental. The dynamic subjectivist point of view is that there are no truths of a Platonic sort and is of course irreligious.
Yet dynamic subjectivism can regard all human though and experience as a kind of fiction-even religious beliefs are regarded as fictions of human construction equivalent to every other concept made by human beings. Those concepts are valued for their utility rather than for potentially apprehending some kind of a mystic, transcendental or self-standing truth for-itself.
Tillich wrote that the pragmatists seek to strengthen human experience and circumstance, yet since they believe human concepts are entirely fictions they also believe that perpetual change of thought content is good in-itself if it has some pragmatic value for making the human circumstance better. Of course the values of good, evil or better are entirely subjective and fictitious too. One could not develop a good theory of utilitarianism on the foundation of dynamic subjectivism.
So I suppose I should write something about the phenomenology that Tillich describes. Beyond superficial descriptions of things-for-themselves the phenomenologists pursue the essents that support being. The neo-Platonist philosopher Plotinus took that sort of approach I think, yet Tillich was reading considering Husserl and Heidegger perhaps as much.
Contemporary quantum mechanics makes it easier to consider the essents or particle fields that make up things like automobiles and eagles then in 1925. Leibniz' spiritual monads are another approach to describing the essence of things, yet for Tillich I believe another course existed-that of meta-logic and the investigation of meaning in reality.
Reality-meaning would be something different from the critical-analytical, phenomenological or pragmatic weltanschauungs (world views). Though many on the pragmatists develop from a critical analytic background, they leave that off to pursue their epistemological Zen of meaninglessness. That subjective epistemology choice is self-limiting.
One cannot be satisfied with the ideology that there is no such thing as the real world and that we must rise above it. The human experience of the world is temporal and with much potential for philosophical development-even beyond this Universe, and that is what are religious faith is about; faith in Jesus Christ the way to the Unconditional.
With that 20th century course of philosophical development one moves from the Frege, Russell and Vienna Circle to empiricism and the post-empiricism of Quine, Strawson, Kripke and others. Early on there was a rival school of thought such as Dewey represented that Tillich could regard as the pragmatic school of thought. Deweian pragmatism is quite different than that of Charles S. Pierce.
Tillich was able to associate various worldviews of religion into three primary ontological paradigms all of which were somewhat exclusive of the others. The critical analytic world-view included science and was empirical, the phenomenological sought the essences things-perhaps more of a Platonic direction, and the pragmatic had what is for the purpose of this brief essay the most interesting point of view.
Today one finds the pragmatic point of view-also known as dynamic subjectivism to be a common populist-elitist party belief. The belief is those concepts are fundamentally meaningless manifestations of human beingness with no transcending value. Though ideas or words and objects may correlate meaningfully, that correlation is entirely a result of ontological relativism in which words and meanings assigned by usage are coincidental. The dynamic subjectivist point of view is that there are no truths of a Platonic sort and is of course irreligious.
Yet dynamic subjectivism can regard all human though and experience as a kind of fiction-even religious beliefs are regarded as fictions of human construction equivalent to every other concept made by human beings. Those concepts are valued for their utility rather than for potentially apprehending some kind of a mystic, transcendental or self-standing truth for-itself.
Tillich wrote that the pragmatists seek to strengthen human experience and circumstance, yet since they believe human concepts are entirely fictions they also believe that perpetual change of thought content is good in-itself if it has some pragmatic value for making the human circumstance better. Of course the values of good, evil or better are entirely subjective and fictitious too. One could not develop a good theory of utilitarianism on the foundation of dynamic subjectivism.
So I suppose I should write something about the phenomenology that Tillich describes. Beyond superficial descriptions of things-for-themselves the phenomenologists pursue the essents that support being. The neo-Platonist philosopher Plotinus took that sort of approach I think, yet Tillich was reading considering Husserl and Heidegger perhaps as much.
Contemporary quantum mechanics makes it easier to consider the essents or particle fields that make up things like automobiles and eagles then in 1925. Leibniz' spiritual monads are another approach to describing the essence of things, yet for Tillich I believe another course existed-that of meta-logic and the investigation of meaning in reality.
Reality-meaning would be something different from the critical-analytical, phenomenological or pragmatic weltanschauungs (world views). Though many on the pragmatists develop from a critical analytic background, they leave that off to pursue their epistemological Zen of meaninglessness. That subjective epistemology choice is self-limiting.
One cannot be satisfied with the ideology that there is no such thing as the real world and that we must rise above it. The human experience of the world is temporal and with much potential for philosophical development-even beyond this Universe, and that is what are religious faith is about; faith in Jesus Christ the way to the Unconditional.
-- Updated August 1st, 2012, 1:16 pm to add the following --
Paul Tillich's 1925 essays on religion and the philosophy of religion are worthwhile reading for those that progress in philosophical readings along a normal course of classical and 20th century philosophy inclusive of linguistic and analytical thought. It is implicitly contradictory for the dynamic subjectivists to posit anything objectively meaningful about an experience they regard as fiction.
With that 20th century course of philosophical development one moves from the Frege, Russell and Vienna Circle to empiricism and the post-empiricism of Quine, Strawson, Kripke and others. Early on there was a rival school of thought such as Dewey represented that Tillich could regard as the pragmatic school of thought. Deweian pragmatism is quite different than that of Charles S. Pierce.
Tillich was able to associate various worldviews of religion into three primary ontological paradigms all of which were somewhat exclusive of the others. The critical analytic world-view included science and was empirical, the phenomenological sought the essences things-perhaps more of a Platonic direction, and the pragmatic had what is for the purpose of this brief essay the most interesting point of view.
Today one finds the pragmatic point of view-also known as dynamic subjectivism to be a common populist-elitist party belief. The belief is those concepts are fundamentally meaningless manifestations of human beingness with no transcending value. Though ideas or words and objects may correlate meaningfully, that correlation is entirely a result of ontological relativism in which words and meanings assigned by usage are coincidental. The dynamic subjectivist point of view is that there are no truths of a Platonic sort and is of course irreligious.
Yet dynamic subjectivism can regard all human though and experience as a kind of fiction-even religious beliefs are regarded as fictions of human construction equivalent to every other concept made by human beings. Those concepts are valued for their utility rather than for potentially apprehending some kind of a mystic, transcendental or self-standing truth for-itself.
Tillich wrote that the pragmatists seek to strengthen human experience and circumstance, yet since they believe human concepts are entirely fictions they also believe that perpetual change of thought content is good in-itself if it has some pragmatic value for making the human circumstance better. Of course the values of good, evil or better are entirely subjective and fictitious too. One could not develop a good theory of utilitarianism on the foundation of dynamic subjectivism.
So I suppose I should write something about the phenomenology that Tillich describes. Beyond superficial descriptions of things-for-themselves the phenomenologists pursue the essents that support being. The neo-Platonist philosopher Plotinus took that sort of approach I think, yet Tillich was reading considering Husserl and Heidegger perhaps as much.
Contemporary quantum mechanics makes it easier to consider the essents or particle fields that make up things like automobiles and eagles then in 1925. Leibniz' spiritual monads are another approach to describing the essence of things, yet for Tillich I believe another course existed-that of meta-logic and the investigation of meaning in reality.
Reality-meaning would be something different from the critical-analytical, phenomenological or pragmatic weltanschauungs (world views). Though many on the pragmatists develop from a critical analytic background, they leave that off to pursue their epistemological Zen of meaninglessness. That subjective epistemology choice is self-limiting.
One cannot be satisfied with the ideology that there is no such thing as the real world and that we must rise above it. The human experience of the world is temporal and with much potential for philosophical development-even beyond this Universe, and that is what are religious faith is about; faith in Jesus Christ the way to the Unconditional.
-- Updated August 1st, 2012, 1:16 pm to add the following --
Paul Tillich's 1925 essays on religion and the philosophy of religion are worthwhile reading for those that progress in philosophical readings along a normal course of classical and 20th century philosophy inclusive of linguistic and analytical thought. It is implicitly contradictory for the dynamic subjectivists to posit anything objectively meaningful about an experience they regard as fiction.
With that 20th century course of philosophical development one moves from the Frege, Russell and Vienna Circle to empiricism and the post-empiricism of Quine, Strawson, Kripke and others. Early on there was a rival school of thought such as Dewey represented that Tillich could regard as the pragmatic school of thought. Deweian pragmatism is quite different than that of Charles S. Pierce.
Tillich was able to associate various worldviews of religion into three primary ontological paradigms all of which were somewhat exclusive of the others. The critical analytic world-view included science and was empirical, the phenomenological sought the essences things-perhaps more of a Platonic direction, and the pragmatic had what is for the purpose of this brief essay the most interesting point of view.
Today one finds the pragmatic point of view-also known as dynamic subjectivism to be a common populist-elitist party belief. The belief is those concepts are fundamentally meaningless manifestations of human beingness with no transcending value. Though ideas or words and objects may correlate meaningfully, that correlation is entirely a result of ontological relativism in which words and meanings assigned by usage are coincidental. The dynamic subjectivist point of view is that there are no truths of a Platonic sort and is of course irreligious.
Yet dynamic subjectivism can regard all human though and experience as a kind of fiction-even religious beliefs are regarded as fictions of human construction equivalent to every other concept made by human beings. Those concepts are valued for their utility rather than for potentially apprehending some kind of a mystic, transcendental or self-standing truth for-itself.
Tillich wrote that the pragmatists seek to strengthen human experience and circumstance, yet since they believe human concepts are entirely fictions they also believe that perpetual change of thought content is good in-itself if it has some pragmatic value for making the human circumstance better. Of course the values of good, evil or better are entirely subjective and fictitious too. One could not develop a good theory of utilitarianism on the foundation of dynamic subjectivism.
So I suppose I should write something about the phenomenology that Tillich describes. Beyond superficial descriptions of things-for-themselves the phenomenologists pursue the essents that support being. The neo-Platonist philosopher Plotinus took that sort of approach I think, yet Tillich was reading considering Husserl and Heidegger perhaps as much.
Contemporary quantum mechanics makes it easier to consider the essents or particle fields that make up things like automobiles and eagles then in 1925. Leibniz' spiritual monads are another approach to describing the essence of things, yet for Tillich I believe another course existed-that of meta-logic and the investigation of meaning in reality.
Reality-meaning would be something different from the critical-analytical, phenomenological or pragmatic weltanschauungs (world views). Though many on the pragmatists develop from a critical analytic background, they leave that off to pursue their epistemological Zen of meaninglessness. That subjective epistemology choice is self-limiting.
One cannot be satisfied with the ideology that there is no such thing as the real world and that we must rise above it. The human experience of the world is temporal and with much potential for philosophical development-even beyond this Universe, and that is what are religious faith is about; faith in Jesus Christ the way to the Unconditional.
-- Updated August 1st, 2012, 1:16 pm to add the following --
Paul Tillich's 1925 essays on religion and the philosophy of religion are worthwhile reading for those that progress in philosophical readings along a normal course of classical and 20th century philosophy inclusive of linguistic and analytical thought. It is implicitly contradictory for the dynamic subjectivists to posit anything objectively meaningful about an experience they regard as fiction.
With that 20th century course of philosophical development one moves from the Frege, Russell and Vienna Circle to empiricism and the post-empiricism of Quine, Strawson, Kripke and others. Early on there was a rival school of thought such as Dewey represented that Tillich could regard as the pragmatic school of thought. Deweian pragmatism is quite different than that of Charles S. Pierce.
Tillich was able to associate various worldviews of religion into three primary ontological paradigms all of which were somewhat exclusive of the others. The critical analytic world-view included science and was empirical, the phenomenological sought the essences things-perhaps more of a Platonic direction, and the pragmatic had what is for the purpose of this brief essay the most interesting point of view.
Today one finds the pragmatic point of view-also known as dynamic subjectivism to be a common populist-elitist party belief. The belief is those concepts are fundamentally meaningless manifestations of human beingness with no transcending value. Though ideas or words and objects may correlate meaningfully, that correlation is entirely a result of ontological relativism in which words and meanings assigned by usage are coincidental. The dynamic subjectivist point of view is that there are no truths of a Platonic sort and is of course irreligious.
Yet dynamic subjectivism can regard all human though and experience as a kind of fiction-even religious beliefs are regarded as fictions of human construction equivalent to every other concept made by human beings. Those concepts are valued for their utility rather than for potentially apprehending some kind of a mystic, transcendental or self-standing truth for-itself.
Tillich wrote that the pragmatists seek to strengthen human experience and circumstance, yet since they believe human concepts are entirely fictions they also believe that perpetual change of thought content is good in-itself if it has some pragmatic value for making the human circumstance better. Of course the values of good, evil or better are entirely subjective and fictitious too. One could not develop a good theory of utilitarianism on the foundation of dynamic subjectivism.
So I suppose I should write something about the phenomenology that Tillich describes. Beyond superficial descriptions of things-for-themselves the phenomenologists pursue the essents that support being. The neo-Platonist philosopher Plotinus took that sort of approach I think, yet Tillich was reading considering Husserl and Heidegger perhaps as much.
Contemporary quantum mechanics makes it easier to consider the essents or particle fields that make up things like automobiles and eagles then in 1925. Leibniz' spiritual monads are another approach to describing the essence of things, yet for Tillich I believe another course existed-that of meta-logic and the investigation of meaning in reality.
Reality-meaning would be something different from the critical-analytical, phenomenological or pragmatic weltanschauungs (world views). Though many on the pragmatists develop from a critical analytic background, they leave that off to pursue their epistemological Zen of meaninglessness. That subjective epistemology choice is self-limiting.
One cannot be satisfied with the ideology that there is no such thing as the real world and that we must rise above it. The human experience of the world is temporal and with much potential for philosophical development-even beyond this Universe, and that is what are religious faith is about; faith in Jesus Christ the way to the Unconditional.
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