On Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion's Conclusion

David Hume was a great British philosopher yet I must stipulate that his work seems especially dated to me. Some concepts seem wrong or off key so far as they have any claim to scientific accuracy. The Essay Concerning Human Understanding is a kind of epistemological work. The 'copy principle' of mind and perceptions that is used in Human Understanding tends to be the criterion for that on Natural Religion too. In a way it is all kind of social solipsism with impressions drawn from historical circumstance. Some may of course feel that Hume was being a deadpan existential relativist concerning religion. At the end he seems to recognize the irresistible logic for it although he may be doing so while having already disqualified all human knowledge as historical circumstance. In particular per example the problem Hume found with cause and effects was taken badly for generations. That seems an unrealistic way of viewing empirical, material affairs. Newton's third law for example, of action and reaction, easily can represent cause and effect even if there is a proceeding cause of the proximal cause.

Hume's concluding discourse by Philo is apposite to the Christian paradigm that he seldom mentions- the unspoken natural religion he is often speaking of. In fact it is a surprising logical affirmation of certain important Christian theological points. God is unapproachably perfect and good and is offended by sin. Mankind has original sin and could in no way have a relationship with God except through an intermediary acting to renormalize saved elements of humanity to God. That individual is the Lord Jesus Christ. I shall quote the relevant section from chapter twelve pages 248-9; “It is contrary to common sense to entertain apprehensions or terrors upon account of any opinion whatsoever, or to imagine that w e run any risk hereafter by the freest; use of our reason. Such a sentiment implies both an absurdity and an inconsistency. It is an absurdity to believe that the Deity has human passions, and one of the lowest of human passions, a restless appetite for applause. It is an inconsistency to believe, that, since the Deity has this human passion, he has not others also; and in particular, a disregard to the opinions of creatures so much inferior. To know God, says Seneca, is to worship him. All other worship is indeed absurd, superstitious, and even impious. It degrades him to the low condition of mankind, who are delighted with intreaty, solicitation, presents, and flattery. Yet is this impiety the smallest of which superstition is guilty. Commonly, it depresses the Deity or rather indeed endeavour to entertain, suitable notions of his divine perfections: As the only persons, intitled to his compassion and indulgence, would be the philosophical Sceptics, a sect almost equally rare, who, from a natural diffidence of their own capacity, suspend, or endeavour to suspend, all judgment with regard to such sublime and such extraordinary subjects. If the whole of Natural Theology, as some people seem to maintain, resolves itself into one simple, though somewhat ambiguous, at least undefined proposition, That the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence: If this proposition be not capable of extension, variation, or more particular explication: If it affords no inference that affects human life, or can be the source of any action or forbearance: And if the analogy, imperfect as it is, can be carried no farther than to the human intelligence; and cannot be transferred, with any appearance of probability, to the other qualities of the mind: If this really be the case, what can the most inquisitive, contemplative, and religious man do more than give a plain, philosophical assent to the proposition, as often as it occurs; and believe that the arguments on which it is established, exceed the objections which lie against it? Some astonishment indeed will naturally arise from the greatness of the object; some melancholy from its obscurity; some contempt of human reason. that it can give no solution more satisfactory with regard to so extraordinary and magnificent a question. But believe me, Cleanthes, the most natural sentiment, which a well-disposed mind will feel on this occasion, is a longing desire and expectation, that heaven would be pleased to dissipate, at least alleviate, this profound ignorance, by affording some more particular revelation to mankind, and making discoveries of the nature, attributes, and operations, of the divine object of our faith. A person, seasoned with a just sense of the imperfections of natural reason, will fly to revealed truth with that he can erect a complete system of Theology by the mere help of philosophy, disdains any farther aid, and rejects this adventitious instructor. To be a philosophical Sceptic is, in a man of letters, the first and most essential step towards being a sound, believing Christian; a proposition, which I would willingly recommend to the attention of Pamphilus :”

Hume ended Kant's dogmatic slumber, though I cannot recall what it was Hume wrote that stimulated Kant to think along lines leading to the Critique of Pure Reason. Perhaps it was Hume's propensity for reasoning about things itself, even if not perfectly in key these days. The idea of the prime mover of causality may have been Hume's target in devising his thought leading to the end of causal relations. I would tend to have a modern point of view on the topic myself that would view matter in its quantum context; as emergent elements in a Higgs field as particles containing elements of force. Hilbert spatial representation and physical content bring selected and necessary states of configuration into being. In the steady-state quantum configuration of matter in-the-Universe mass follows thermodynamic principles. Not to labor the point, I believe one need use a fuzzy logic accounting system for attributing causes and effects. High pressure and low pressure, high temperature and low temperature, Boyle's law, equalization of pressure and temperature and allocation of a force follow consistent lines.

Hume wrote in chapter twelve of the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion that “still it must be acknowledged, that, as terror is the primary principle of religion, it is the passion which always predominates in it, and admits but of short intervals of pleasure.” I don't agree at all that mankind has stimulus-response S/R conditioning and fear of worse in eternity as his primary motives. Knowledge is an end-in-itself that mankind tries to get. A sentient being has just so much that he or she may do; physical and intellectual things running even toward the spiritual. Seeking a knowledge of God for-himself rather than trying to explain away all of human experience and interests as biological activities solely and dismissively are quite opposite activities. The former seeks to enlighten the mind while the latter acts to extinguish thought.

David Hume's approach is one of reason, yet it is revealed knowledge; grace from God, that is the credible reason for belief of Christians,  rather than a posteriori logic.