Feyerabend seems to have had more of a phenomenologist's paradigm of a philosophy of science than Popper. Popper's preference for falsification of scientific works is reasonable enough. Falsfication of a scientific idea is still phenomenal and within a Sartrian paradigm of existential, dialectical reason. Science projects require testing and falsification or confirmation. If Cern didn't find a Higgs Bosun some people wouldn't believe it (they) exists. For a while people will believe it does ntil it turns out to be a package made of something else, or an emergent appearance from something unknown today.
If one uses CS Pierce's crterion of pragmatism (does it work) or even MIll's utilitarian and Austin's consequentialism to decide if a scientific presentation has value, maybe that's good enough. One does not need the ultimate hovercraft car that works on hydrogen to have a car; even a Tesla roadster counts as a useful, intermediate vehicle. Newton's theory of gravity was good enough for some time after all.
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